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Abstract
Two threads regarding the recent feud between AMC
Theaters and MoviePass have been quite popular in the
news cycle: (i) the impending bankruptcy of MoviePass
and (ii) the Twitter war between the two players. In
this paper, we seek to evaluate if such developments are
mere aberrations or if there is any economic rationale
behind them. We develop a parsimonious microeconomic
model for this purpose that sheds light on the competition/cooperation responses of a theater chain towards the
entry of a non-essential intermediary. Our results have
important implications for management and policy.
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1.

Introduction

In recent times, the name MoviePass has been making frequent rounds in the headlines. In particular, two threads have been quite popular: (i) the
impending bankruptcy that MoviePass faces from
“burning” its money [8], and (ii) the fierce war of
words that broke out in the Twitter sphere between
MoviePass and AMC Theaters [2]. As observers, we
found both developments interesting.
First, MoviePass’s impending bankruptcy predictions seemed questionable. After all, just a few
months earlier, the majority stake in the company
had been purchased by a New-York-based data
analytics firm, Helios and Matheson Analytics, or
HMA in short. The “money-burning” approach that
MoviePass had undertaken was implemented well
before its acquisition by HMA. Now, could HMA
actually be this naive in their investment decisions?
Had their investment calculus not considered the full
import of MoviePass’ money-burning strategy? Second, quite remarkable was the sudden hostile posture that MoviePass and AMC seemed to have taken
against each other despite their initial partnership in
2014. What could have transpired between the two
that would so suddenly break their seemingly thriving business alliance? In December of 2014, in an
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interview with the New York Times, Christina Sternberg, the senior vice president for corporate strategy at AMC, had defended the collaboration with
MoviePass by saying, “It frankly wouldn’t be smart
to ignore the success of subscription in other areas of
media.” If the idea of a third-party subscription platform was this critical then, what could have changed
that perception so soon, in less than three years?
We found these questions quite intriguing and
decided to put them under a microscope with a
microeconomic lens. The purpose of this research,
therefore, is to seek economic intuitions behind
such surprising observations in practice. In particular, we want to study the game-theoretic interactions between two companies—a near-monopolist
retailer (AMC) and a “non-essential” intermediary
(MoviePass)—to better understand their “hot-andcold behavior” of cooperation and competition, and
to examine if the recent developments and predictions have any economic basis.
Some context is perhaps necessary here. Since the
severe economic downturn in 2008–09, the annual
revenue of the US and Canada box office has been
hovering around the $10 to $11 billion mark and
has failed to put together any consistent upward
trend over the last decade. In fact, the three
major movie-theater chains in the US and Canada—
AMC, Regal, and Cinemark—have all been struggling to attract moviegoers. It was into this stagnated industry that MoviePass made its first entry
in 2011. Before its entry, the industry consisted of
a three-tiered—studio (manufacturer) to distributor
to theater/exhibitor (retailer)—supply chain, with
significant monopolistic power at each level [17].
With its smartphone-based subscription platform,1
MoviePass wanted to insert itself into this supply
1

The entire MoviePass model is administered through a
smartphone making use of its internet and GPS connections.
At the time of signing up, every subscriber is issued a debit
card. When a subscriber is in close proximity of a particular
theater, he can find out which movies are available at that
theater at that time. Now, if he chooses to view one from this
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chain as a fourth player, between a theater and
its consumers (the moviegoers), working in tandem with the existing channel (direct sales). While
only a few small/fringe theater showed interest in
MoviePass intitially, by 2014, AMC entered into a
partnership with MoviePass [6]. In 2017, MoviePass
made a “mad” dash to increase its subscription base
by announcing a subscription fee of only $9.95 to
watch upto 30 movies a month, an amount that was
hardly enoough to cover an individual ticket. All
major theater chains, with AMC leading the pack,
criticized this move. And, almost magically, within
a short time thereafter, all these chains rolled out
their own platform/app and announced their own
subscription services.
There are several streams of literature related to
this work. Among them is the literature on intermediation. Intermediaries are firms that connect buyers
with sellers and generate value by reducing transaction costs [5], which include search, fit, and coordination costs as well as risks arising from information
asymmetry [7, 9]. Prior research has diligently studied how a market may evolve through intermediation, disintermediation, and reintermediation [4, 10].
We do not study this process; instead, we contribute
by studying whether or not a seller should combat a
nonessential intermediary that seeks to insert itself
between the seller (a movie theater) and buyers.
Even though a pass that allows a consumer
to watch multiple movies is akin to a bundle of
movies [1]—or perhaps a quasi-bundle as the choice
of the bundle constituents is in the hands of the consumer [11]—our objective in this paper is quite a bit
different from that of the traditional bundling literature. First, we do not focus on the issue of reducing
demand elasticity through bundling. Second, when
a pass is offered to consumers along with individual tickets, there would be usage-based discrimination [18]. Unlike prior research, however, both our
seller and the intermediary can offer a pass, which
leads to interesting strategic dilemmas. Specifically,
(i) should the intermediary target only frequent consumers or all consumers, and (ii) should the theater
cooperate with the intermediary or compete against
it by offering its own subscription service? We are
among the first to carefully study these questions.
set, the amount of money necessary to buy an individual ticket
at the counter/kiosk would be immediately transferred to his
debit card, which he can use to purchase the ticket. This business model guarantees that a theater can never really block
a MoviePass subscriber from watching movies at its facilities
and MoviePass does not need a prior contract to invade a
market.

2.

Model Preliminaries

We start with a situation where there is no intermediary, but there is just a monopolist movie theater who sets the price, p > 0, at which consumers
(moviegoers) are offered individual movie tickets.
Also, the theater has the option of offering a periodic subscription plan—henceforth, called a pass—
at a fee, f > 0, which would allow a subscriber to
see all the n movies released during the subscription
period; in our model, n is exogenous. Facing such
a pricing scheme, our moviegoers make their actual
consumption decisions.

2.1.

Consumer Behavior

We consider a heterogeneous set of moviegoers
whose mass is normalized to one. Our moviegoers
belong to two broad categories based on their proclivity towards watching movies in a theater: (i) high
type: a λ fraction of frequent moviegoers who regularly visit the theater, and (ii) low type: the remaining (1 − λ) fraction of infrequent moviegoers who
are occasional visitors to the theater. Consumers are
also heterogeneous in their taste for movies; different consumers derive different values from watching a movie and, in addition to their own proclivity
towards watching movies. Clearly, each movie j is
a different experience for a moviegoer i, and each
moviegoer gets a different benefit from watching it.
Therefore, we assume:
Assumption 1. A frequent moviegoer i’s valuation for a movie j, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, is vij , whereas
that of an infrequent moviegoer is (vij − µ), vij i.i.d.
and uniform over [0, 1] and µ ∈ (0, 1) a constant.
In essence, Assumption 1 tells us that for any given
movie j, consumer valuations are i.i.d. and drawn
from a uniform distribution over [0, 1] and, at the
same time, for any consumer i, his valuations for all
n movies are also i.i.d. and drawn from the same distribution. One can view µ as a parameter that captures the added inertia or lack of motivation faced
by infrequent moviegoers.
Frequent Moviegoers. If a high type buys the
pass at f , he would surely want to derive the maximum benefit from it; that is, he would end up seeing
all the n movies allowed by the pass. Since his valuation for each of these n movies is uniform over
[0, 1], his expected valuation for each movie is onehalf, implying that the following individual rationality constraint must be satisfied for him to buy the
pass: n2 − f ≥ 0.
To derive his incentive compatibility constraint for
the pass, we consider his overall benefit from buying
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individual tickets instead. First, the frequent consumer i watches a movie j iff vij − p ≥ 0; he refrains
otherwise. Therefore, his expected surplus from tick)2
. As long as this
ets per subscription period is n(1−p
2
surplus is below the surplus from the pass, n2 − f —
that is, as long as f ≤ np 1 − 2p —he would prefer
the pass over purchasing individual tickets.
Infrequent Moviegoers. Unlike the high type,
a low type would not see all the n movies even if
he buys the pass. Only a (1 − µ) fraction of movies
would satisfy: vij − µ ≥ 0. So, his expected surplus
)2
, which must be no less that f
per period is n(1−µ
2
for him to buy the pass. Now, an infrequent consumer i who does not have the pass would buy a
ticket to watch movie j iff vij −p−µ ≥ 0; accordingly,
his expected per-period surplus from tickets would
)2
be n(1−p−µ
. When this surplus is no bigger than
2
 the
surplus from tickets—that is, f ≤ np 1 − µ − 2p —he
would prefer the pass over individual tickets.

2.2.

Theater’s Problem

Typically, studios and distributors charge the theater a pre-negotiated amount per seat sold [14], so
we assume that the theater faces a marginal cost of
c per sold seat:
Assumption 2. A theater incurs a marginal cost
c > 0 for each theater seat sold.
If the theater offers a subscription plan, it must
choose p and f in such a way that a consumer’s
appropriate IR and IC conditions are met. For a
given p, the theater’s profit is increasing in f . Therefore, the theater would choose as high an f as possible that barely satisfies one of these constraints,
making the appropriate constraint an equality in
equilibrium. Hence, we have:
Lemma 1. The theater sells the pass at f ∗ =
if it wants only the frequent consumers to
2
subscribe to it. If the theater wants to attract infrequent consumers as well, it sets f ∗ = np(2(12−µ)−p) <
np(2−p)
.
2
np(2−p)

It is clear from Lemma 1 that, it is impossible for
the theater to price in a way that attracts only the
low type and keeps the high type out. Therefore,
three broad scenarios are possible for the theater:
Case 1: Sell Tickets Only, No Pass. When the
pass is not offered, for every movie, a (1 − p) fraction
of the high type and a (1 − p − µ) fraction of the low
type shall buy a ticket. The total demand faced by

the theater from all the n movies is, therefore, given
by:
(
nλ(1 − p) + n(1 − λ)(1 − p − µ), if p < 1 − µ,
q=
nλ(1 − p),
otherwise,
where the second case, p ≥ 1 − µ, represents a situation in which the low types are priced out of the market and only the high types buy tickets; this limiting
subcase of Case 1 is denoted as Case 1L. Maximizing
the theater’s profit, π = q(p − c), we get:
Proposition 1. When selling only tickets, the
theater’s optimal price and profit are:

2

 ∗ 1+c−µ(1−λ)
p1 =
,
, if λ< 1−c−µ
∗
2
µ
p =
and
p∗ = 1+c ,
otherwise,
1L
2



π ∗ = n(1−c−µ(1−λ))2 , if λ< 1−c−µ 2 ,
∗
1
4
µ
π =
π ∗ = nλ(1−c)2 ,
otherwise.
1L

4

Case 2: Sell Pass to Only Frequent Consumers. In this case, the theater sets f ∗ = np(22−p) ,
as per Lemma 1. Since those who subscribe to the
pass watch all the n movies, the total profit from
the subscription plan is λ(f ∗ − nc). Also, as long as
p < 1 − µ, the theater enjoys some additional profit
from ticket sales to the low types. The overall profit
to the theater can then be written as:

 
np(2−p)

λ
−
nc
+

2

π=
 n(p − c)(1 −
 λ)(1 − p − µ), if p < 1 − µ,


λ np(2−p) − nc ,
otherwise.
2

As before, the second case (p ≥ 1 − µ) arises when
the low types are priced out of the market; this subcase of Case 2 is denoted Case 2L. Maximizing the
theater’s profit, we find the equilibrium solution:
Proposition 2. When selling passes to only the
frequent consumers, the theater’s optimal tariffs are:
(
(1−c−µ)2
(p∗2 , f2∗ ) ,
if λ < (1
,
∗
∗
−c)2 +µ2
(p , f ) =

∗
(p∗2L , f2L
) = 1, n2 , otherwise,
where p∗2 =
f2∗ =

1+(1−λ)(c−µ)
2−λ

and

n(1 + (1 − λ)(c − µ))(3 − 2λ − (1 − λ)(c − µ))
.
2(2 − λ)2

Correspondingly, the theater’s optimal profit is given
n(1+(c2 −µ2 )(1−λ)2 −2(1−µ(1−λ))(c+µ(1−λ)))
by: π2∗ =
and
2(2−λ)
nλ(1−2c)
∗
π2L =
.
2
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Case 3: Sell Pass to All Consumers. In
this case, from Lemma 1, the theater sets f ∗ =
np(2(1−µ)−p)
, and all consumers subscribe to the pass.
2
Among them, the high types watch all the n movies,
but the low, only n(1 − µ). Therefore, the total profit
from the subscription plan is π = λ(f ∗ − nc) + (1 −
λ)(f ∗ − nc(1 − µ)). Individual tickets, although still
sold nominally, are no longer purchased; so, they do
not contribute to the overall profit. We maximize the
theater’s profit to get:
Proposition 3. When selling passes to all the
consumers, the theater’s optimal tariffs are: p∗3 = 1 −
)2
µ and f3∗ = n(1−µ
. The theater’s optimal profit is
2
2c)−2cλµ)
π3∗ = n((1−µ)(1−µ−
.
2

2.3.

Theater’s Optimal Strategy

It is clear from the earlier analyses that the theater can adopt any one of the above three strategies. Naturally, it would choose the strategy that
yields the highest profit for a given set of parameter
values. Since closed-form profit expressions exist in
each of the five cases—Cases 1, 1L, 2, 2L, and 3—it
is easy to analytically compare them in a pairwise
fashion to ascertain the possible boundaries that separate these cases. Fortunately, closed-form expressions exist for these boundaries, too, and the entire
parameter space can be partitioned into five regions,
one each for the five cases:

√ 
Theorem 1. Let γ1 = 1 − µ 1 + λ , γ2 =
√
√
√(1−λ) , γ4 = (1 − µ)( 2 − 1) −
2 − 1, γ3 = 1−µ
1+ 2(2−λ)


√
µ 1+ λ(2−λ)
(1−µ)2 −λ
µλ, γ5 = 2(1−µ)(1−λ) , γ6 = 1 −
, and
1−λ
√
(1−µ)( 2−λ−1)−µλ
. Furthermore, for all λ ∈
γ
i 1−λ
h7 =
√
√
1−2µ
, 1 , define γ8 = ξ1 + ξ2 and γ80 = ξ1 − ξ2 ,
2(1−µ)
where ξ1 = 1 − 2λ − µ(1 − λ) and ξ2 = 2λ(2µ(1 −
λ) − 1 + 2λ). Then, the following equilibrium regions
emerge:
• Region 1: Ticket to All. The theater sells
individual tickets to both consumer segments if
(i) γ3 , γ4 ≤ c < γ1 , and (ii) c ≥ γ8 or c < γ80 .
• Region 1L: Ticket to High. The theater sells
individual tickets to the high type and prices out the
low type if c ≥ γ1 , γ2 .
• Region 2: Pass to High, Ticket to Low.
The theater sells the pass to the high type and individual tickets to the low if γ5 ≤ c < γ3 , γ6 .
• Region 2L: Pass to High. The theater offers
the pass to the high type and prices out the low if
(i) γ6 , γ7 ≤ c < γ2 , and either (ii) γ80 ≤ c < γ8 or
(iii) c ≥ 1 − µ.
• Region 3: Pass to All. The theater offers the
pass to both consumer segments if c < γ4 , γ5 , γ7 .

3.

Entry of a Digital Platform and
the Ensuing “Competition”

Having described its pricing strategy as a monopoly,
we now consider how the theater would respond
when a digital platform (MoviePass) enters the market and offers a subscription service for n movies at
a fee of g per subscription period. Such a pass provides its subscribers not only the benefit of watching
all n movies, but also the flexibility to watch them
at other theaters that may be more convenient at
times. We capture this flexibility—as well as any
other cross-consumption benefits a third-party platform may provide—by ascribing to the pass an additional utility of δ ∈ (0, 1) per movie, that is, a total
of δn for each high type and δn(1 − µ) for each low
type.
The platform incurs a marginal cost, say r, per
seat; that is, r is the per-seat transfer price from
the platform to the theater. Since the platform can
always purchase tickets for its subscribers at the
market price p, it has no incentive to pay any higher.
Therefore, r cannot be any higher than p, the price
charged by the theater for an individual ticket. Furthermore, the theater’s profit is always increasing in
r, so the theater would like to set r as high as possible. Therefore:
Lemma 2. In the subgame perfect equilibrium,
r = p, where p is the price charged by the theater for
an individual ticket.
Just like the theater, the platform also lacks the
ability to price out the high type while attracting the
low type. Therefore, the platform has three choices:
(i) do not enter the market, (ii) offer the pass to only
the high type, or (iii) offer the pass to all consumers.
When offering the pass only to the high type at fee g,
the platform must ensure that the high type would
)2
,
actually purchase it, implying n2 +δn − g ≥ n(1−p
2
or equivalently, g ≤ n δ + p 1 − 2p .
When offering the pass to all consumers, however,
the platform must ensure that the low type also participates. This it can do by choosing a g that abides
)2
)2
by n(1−µ
+ δn(1 − µ) − g ≥ n(1−p−µ
, 
which is
2
2
equivalent to g ≤ n δ(1 − µ) + p 1 − µ − 2p . Since
the platform’s profit is linearly increasing g, it would
choose the maximum possible value while ensuring
participation from consumers, as described above. In
other words:
Lemma 3. In the subgame perfect equilibrium,

the platform sets the pass at g ∗ = n δ + p(22−p)
if it wants only the frequent consumers to subscribe to it. On the other hand, if the platform
wants to attract infrequent consumers, it sets g ∗ =
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)−p)
n δ(1 − µ) + p(2(1−µ
, a lower subscription fee
2
that lures the frequent segment in as well.
Now, when offering the pass only to the high type
at g, the platform makes a total profit of πplat =
λ(g ∗ − np). It would offer such a pass only if this
profit is positive, implying g ∗ ≥ np. On the other
hand, if it offers the pass to all consumers, the platform would make a total profit of:
πplat = λ(g ∗ − np) + (1 − λ)(g ∗ − np(1 − µ)).
For this profit to be positive, we must have g ∗ ≥
λnp + (1 − λ)np(1 − µ). The next result then follows
directly from Lemma 3:
Theorem 2. The platform would offer the pass
2
to the high type only if δ ≥ p2 , and to both types only
p(p+2λµ)
if δ ≥ 2(1−µ) . Equivalently, the theater can block
√
the platform’s market entry by setting p > 2δ.
The entry deterrence mechanism in Theorem 2 is
markedly different from the typical ones found in the
economics literature. In the literature, the incumbent firm usually sets the price so low that potential
entrants are discouraged from entering [19, p.306];
in contrast, in Theorem 2, the incumbent actually
raises the price to stave off the entrant. There is one
similarity, though. In both cases, the entry deterrence turns out to be a costly proposition to the
incumbent. Just as a lower price can lead to a lower
revenue, so can a higher price by shrinking demand
to a suboptimal level.
Thus, our theater holds a costly option of
√ deterring entry by choosing a price higher than 2δ. Of
course, it would exercise that option only when it
is actually more profitable
√ to do so. Now, if it does
exercise, that is, if p > 2δ, our solutions in the previous section—see Propositions 1, 2, and 3—would
apply as before. Therefore, we now focus on the case
where δ is sufficiently large and the theater and the
platform coexist in the market.

3.1.

Theater’s Problem in the Presence
of a Digital Platform

Depending on whether the platform targets only the
frequent consumers or caters to all of them, two additional scenarios emerge; henceforth, we will call them
as Cases 4 and 5. Before we discuss them in detail,
the following result is necessary:
Lemma 4. If it allows the platform to enter the
market, the theater would have no incentive to offer
a competing pass of its own.

The intuition behind Lemma 4 is as follows. When
it wants to block the platform’s entry, the theater
√
can only do so by jacking up the price above 2δ.
However, as mentioned above, this maneuver may
be costly as it may result in a disproportionate loss
in demand. However, if the theater has the necessary technology to offer a subscription pass of its
own, it can mitigate some of the loss by extending an effective price reduction through this pass to
its subscribers. This way, its ability to offer its own
pass grants the theater a cheaper option to block
the entry if it so desires. Naturally, when it is not
optimal to stave off the entrant, the option its own
pass creates is no longer of any value, and the theater finds no incentive to continue offering its own
pass.
Lemma 4 tells us that, in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, only one pass can exist in the market, not
two. It also tells us that, in Cases 4 and 5, the theater only sells individual tickets. Of course, as per
Lemma 2, it would continue to collect r = p from the
platform every time a subscriber walks in to watch
a movie.
Case 4: Digital Platform Targets the Frequent Consumers Only. In this case, the theater
makes (p − c) for each high-type moviegoer; the rest
continues to buy individual tickets as before. Therefore, the theater’s total profit can be written as:


λn(p − c)+
π=
n(p − c)(1 − λ)(1 − p − µ), if p < 1 − µ,


λn(p − c),
otherwise.
Once again, the second case (p ≥ 1 − µ) arises when
the low type is priced out of the market. The theater
maximizes this profit subject
√ to the platform’s participation constraint, p < 2δ. The solution to this
optimization problem can be expressed as:
Proposition 4. When the platform targets only
the frequent consumers, the theater’s optimal price
is given by:

−(c+µ)
c−µ
∗
+ 2(11−λ) , if λ < 21−
and δ ≥ ∆1 ,

p4 = √
2
(c+µ)
∗
∗
p = p4A = 2δ,
if δ < ∆1 and δ < ∆2 ,
√

 ∗
(c+µ)
p4B = 2δ,
if λ ≥ 12−
and δ ≥ ∆2 ,
−(c+µ)
where ∆1 =

(1+(1−λ)(c−µ))2
8(1−λ)2

(1−µ)2
The
2
n(1−(1−λ)(c+µ))2
∗
, π4A =
)
 4(1−λ

and ∆2 =

profit is given by π4∗ =
√

√
√
n
2δ − c 1−µ− 2δ+λ
2δ+µ
√

nλ
2δ − c .

∗
, or π4B
=
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∗ 
The platform sets g ∗ = n δ + p∗ 1 − p2 . The
platform makes zero profit inCases 4A and 4B, and

−λ)(c−µ))2
makes a profit of π4,plat = nλ δ − (1+(18(1
>
2
−λ)
0 in Case 4.

It is important to note that the profit function
above is linear in p for p ≥ 1 − µ, and an interior
solution is not possible there. Therefore, an interior
solution can happen only for p < 1 − µ, implying that
p∗4 must be less than (1 − µ). This, in turn, means
that both segments are served in Region 4. The two
limit regions, 4A and 4B, are quite interesting. In
these regions, the interior p∗ is so high that, as such,
the platform would not enter the market. However,
in these two cases, upon finding the platform’s presence beneficial, the theater simply holds the price
of individual
√ tickets infinitesimally below the limit
price of 2δ, enticing the platform to barely enter
the market. The difference between the two cases is
that, in 4A, the theater
√ serves the infrequent ∗seg∗
2δ < 1 − µ, but in 4B, p4B =
ment,
that
is,
p
=
4A
√
2δ ≥ 1 − µ and the infrequent segment is effectively
priced out.
Case 5: Digital Platform Caters to All Consumers. In this case, the theater makes (p − c)
every time a moviegoer walks in, and no one buys
individual tickets any longer. Therefore, the theater’s total profit can be written as:
π = λn(p − c)(λ + (1 − λ)(1 − µ)).

Proposition 5. When the platform caters to all
consumers, in
r equilibrium, the theater charges a
2
)
∗
price of p5 = 2δ(11−λ−µ
+ 1λµ
− 1λµ
and makes
−λ
−λ
−λ
∗
∗
a profit of π
The platform
5 = n(1 − µ(1 −

λ))(p5 − c).
p∗
and makes
sets g5∗ = n δ(1 − µ) + p∗5 1 − µ − 25
∗
a profit of π5,plat
=

3.2.

nλµ(δ +λp∗
5)
1−λ

.

Theater’s Optimal Reaction
Facing Entry of a Digital Platform

It is clear from this analysis that the theater can
adopt any one of the above five strategies, implying that the equilibrium could occur in any one of
the nine cases discussed earlier (that is, Cases 15 and the four limit cases). Naturally, the theater
would choose the strategy that yields the highest
profit for a given set of parameter values. Since
closed-form profit expressions exist in all the nine
cases—see Propositions 1–5—we can analytically
compare
them
 in a pairwise fashion to obtain the

36 = 2!(99!−2)! boundaries that separate these nine
cases. Similar to Theorem 1, closed-form expressions
exist for all these boundaries, and the entire parameter space can be partitioned into appropriate regions.
We illustrate the partitions in Figure 1; please note
that not all nine cases necessarily occur in the equilibrium.
c
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.
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0
0
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It is clear that this profit is linearly increasing in p,
and there can be no interior solution as such. Therefore, for this case to occur, the theater must set p
in such a way that it becomes possible for the platform to offer the pass to both the segments, with
no incentive to price the infrequent segment out of
the market. It may seem from Theorem 2 that the
theater can make it barely possible for the platform
to cater to all consumers bypsetting a p that satisfies
p+2λµ)
, implying p = 2δ(1 − µ) + (λµ)2 − λµ.
δ = p(2(1
−µ)
For this to occur, though, the platform must also

play along and set g = n δ(1 − µ) + p 1 − µ − 2p .
However, in that case, the platform would make no
profit at all and, as it turns out, the platform can
actually do better.
This it can do by setting g =

n δ + p 1 − 2p and attracting only the high type
to the pass, thus violating the condition that both
the segments be served.
Therefore, in order to induce the platform to cater
to both the segments, the theater must reduce the
(1−λ)+2λµ)
price further to a level where δ = p(p2(1
, a
−λ−µ)
point at which the platform becomes indifferent
between the two choices.
Accordingly, the equilibrium can be stated as:

δ
Figure 1. Partitions of the (δ, c) Space for Theater Having
its Own Technology; λ = 0.3, µ = 0.25

There are several interesting observations that can
be made from this analysis. First, for a given c, the
theater allows the platform to coexist only if it is
more profitable to do so; we find that this actually
happens when the platform brings in a sufficiently
high δ. When δ is small, the theater’s profit does not
change with δ (Regions 1, 1L, 2, 2L, 3). However, in
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Regions 4, 4A, 4B, 5—that is, when δ is larger—the
theater’s profit starts increasing with δ.
Viewed differently, with respect to δ, there is a
threshold of resistance around which the theater’s
strategic response to the platform’s entry shows a
remarkable reversal; this threshold is denoted φ and
marked by the red curve in Figure 1. When δ is to the
left of φ, the benefit to the theater is not adequate
and the theater sees no reason to cooperate with the
platform, so the theater resists the entry. As δ moves
to the right of the φ curve, though, the platform’s
appeal grows and it becomes difficult for the theater
to keep it out of the market. Initially, in Regions
4A and 4B, the theater accommodates the platform
while raising p to wrest away all of the platform’s
profits. In other words, the theater effectively holds
off the platform—although the platform enters the
market, it barely treads water, as the theater usurps
any extra value generated by the platform’s superior
product.
Nevertheless, as δ gets larger still, the theater
realizes that holding off the platform is now much
costlier, as a high p starts taking a heavy toll on the
overall demand. A point is finally reached where, in
fact, it becomes profitable for the theater to back
off, causing the equilibrium to shift to Region 4 or 5.
Viewed another way, the theater can marginalize the
platform when c is moderate (Regions 4A and 4B).
However, if c is small, setting p too high and forgoing
a substantial portion of the market becomes counterproductive. So, the theater fully accommodates
the platform and allows it to walk away with some
profit (Regions 4 and 5).
In broader terms, the intermediary is a middleman, and resisting its entry to a point indeed makes
good economic sense. However, resisting becomes
difficult in certain situations, particularly if doing
so requires raising the ticket price to a level that is
disproportionately high when compared to c. So, if
δ is high, sharing the additional value generated is
preferable to costly resistance.

4.

“Hot-and-Cold” Relationship

Why did AMC partner with MoviePass in the first
place, only to break the alliance in less than three
years, and why did MoviePass offer a pricing scheme
that is not sustainable for long? Our modeling experiment provides a plausible economic rationale behind
such apparently anomalous actions.
To understand, we must note that the equilibrium
discussed in Figure 1 is derived under the assumption that the theater has the necessary IT infrastructure for offering its own subscription service electronically. If it does not, Cases 2, 2L, and 3 are no

longer possible, as the theater now lacks the ability to offer its own pass. The resulting equilibrium
is obtained in a manner similar to the one adopted
earlier. We simply compare the theater’s profits in
Cases 1, 1L, 4, 4A, 4B, and 5, and pick the case that
results in the maximum for a particular set of parameter values. The resulting equilibrium is illustrated
in Figure 2. In this figure, the boundary between
c
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Figure 2. Partitions of the (δ, c) Space for Theater without
Technology; λ = 0.3, µ = 0.25

where the theater resists the platform and where
they coexist is denoted ψ and is marked by a blue
curve representing the new threshold of resistance.
Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, one can see that,
as long as c is not too large, the blue boundary, ψ, is
to the left of the red one, φ. Viewed differently, there
is a swing region where, depending on whether or
not it possesses the required technical infrastructure,
the theater’s response could be markedly different.
In order to see this region more clearly, in Figure 3,
we superimpose Figure 2 on Figure 1, and zoom into
the interesting portion. This way, the swing region
is clearly demarcated by the dashed blue and red
curves.
Now, consider a situation where the real-world
context is within this region and, say, is represented
by the purple dot. If that is indeed the case, the theater’s strategy would encounter a remarkable shift
depending on whether it has the required technology
or not. If it does not, the theater, being to the right
of the blue curve (ψ), would tend to accommodate
the platform. On the other hand, when the theater
acquires the necessary technology, the red curve (φ)
takes over; being to the left of that curve, the theater
now competes fiercely with the platform and forces
it out of the market. What is really interesting is
that, irrespective of the values of λ and µ, a portion
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Figure 3. Shifting Behavior in the (δ, c) Space; λ = 0.3,
µ = 0.25

of the blue curve is always to the left of the red one
as long as c is not too large, implying that the swing
region always exists.
Theorem 3. For all values of λ, µ ∈ (0, 1), there
is always a non-empty swing region, where the theater cooperates when it does not have the necessary
technology, but competes when it acquires the technology.
According to Theorem 3, the swing region always
exists, and this region might explain what we all
observed in practice. Towards the end of 2014, AMC
was just warming up to the idea of having a subscription model in place but did not have the necessary technology.2 Therefore, its initial support for
MoviePass’ subscription platform to fill a few more
empty seats—or, perhaps, to learn from MoviePass’
platform by watching it from close quarters—was a
sensible strategy at that time. However, AMC must
have known all along that it could make a better
profit if it possessed its own technology, so it must
have invested in developing a platform of its own. A
little more than two years later, likely by the middle
of 2017, AMC had the basic system in place, and its
initial strategy was no longer the right one. It is at
this point that AMC decided to adopt an aggressive
posture. In other words, our exercise finds that the
real-world events have a possible economic basis—
AMC knew what it was doing both in 2014 and in
2

Interestingly, even though AMC now has the basic technology necessary to administer its subscription service over the
smartphone, it still lags behind MoviePass in several regards.
For example, it does not integrate the smartphone’s GPS
information and cannot track its subscribers’ location on a
real-time basis. It also does not have the ability to push targeted advertisement based on the customer’s location.

2017, and its behavior is in line with that of a profitmaximizing economic agent.
Now, what can we say about the actions taken by
MoviePass? If our economic model is to be believed,
even back in 2014, MoviePass was likely aware of
the entire situation that would unfold once AMC
developed its own infrastructure. In other words, as
a rational economic agent, MoviePass could anticipate that AMC would eventually break the alliance.
The only way MoviePass could get any cooperation
from AMC had to be by increasing the perceived
value of δ and moving the purple point to the right
of the red boundary in Figure 3. In fact, the $9.95
subscription fee—a pricing strategy that was compared to burning money by many—was likely a move
geared towards just that. Within a year of announcing the deal, MoviePass’ subscriber base ballooned
to over three millions, making it difficult for theater chains to ignore MoviePass [3, 6]. Penetration
pricing to gain market share has been a well-known
strategy [12, 15], and MoviePass’ introductory pricing was certainly no different. Those who speculated
that MoviePass would go bankrupt had somehow
assumed implicitly that MoviePass would continue
to offer this deal for ever. However, such introductory pricing is usually for a limited period. It is,
therefore, no coincidence that this pricing deal has
recently been abandoned in favor of a new one [13].3
How can a bigger subscriber base enhance δ, the
value added by the platform? The answer lies in the
fact that, after all, MoviePass is a digital platform
bringing different theater chains and their consumers
together. Two-sided markets are known to generate
network effects, both within as well as across the two
sides [16]. The cross-platform network effect is easy
to see. As more consumers flock to the platform, it
becomes difficult for theater chains to ignore that
segment, creating an economic incentive for more of
them to join in. When a moviegoer sees more theaters in his choice list, it gives him more flexibility
in terms of where he may watch the movie, resulting
in a higher δ. Therefore, as MoviePass increases its
subscription base, it also increases the perceived δ.
To understand the same-side network effect, we
must note that MoviePass can amass a significant
volume of data on its subscribers’ viewing and
other consumption habits, along with location and
movement data. In fact, just to use the MoviePass
app—the only way one can access the platform—
permission must be granted to use the location
3

Effective August 15, 2018, MoviePass allows only three free
movies per month for a monthly fee of $9.95; it also imposes
certain restrictions on the choice of movies and theaters.
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service of the device, at least partially (that is,
when the app is on). Running this huge volume
of data through sophisticated data analytics tools,
MoviePass can mine useful insights on personalization, recommendation, market segmentation, and
product promotion. This, in turn, can not only
enhance the platform’s value to its subscribers, but
can also bring a separate value proposition to theaters and studios. MoviePass can also make alliances
with other types of merchants—bars, restaurants,
coffee shops, flower and gift shops—and offer discounts on their products, creating positive crossconsumption effects. For this part, MoviePass can
target businesses with whom MoviePass shares common consumers; this way, MoviePass can make further use of the insights it learns from data analytics to demonstrate that it can indeed influence subscribers’ consumption behavior through appropriate
marketing maneuvers [2].
Not surprisingly, MoviePass is already doing all
of the above. HMA, the data analytics firm that
currently owns the majority share in MoviePass
made the acquisition simply to get access to the
platform that stores, among other things, its subscribers’ consumption behavior. MoviePass itself has
openly boasted about its capability to mine the huge
volumes of subscriber data that it has amassed.
For example, at this point, MoviePass accounts for
about only 3% of all box office sales; however, the
number apparently jumps to 10% when MoviePass
actively pushes a product [2]. Clearly, the main
thrust at MoviePass seems to be mining deeper
insights about consumer behavior and monetizing
these insights in an innovative way. Naturally, many
of these insights may also allow MoviePass to create better value for its subscribers, thereby influencing their perception of δ positively. For example, features such as timely recommendation and
notifications, targeted discounts, and access to consumer reviews could enhance a subscriber’s overall
experience with MoviePass. Naturally, the usefulness
of such features—and their impact on δ—ought to
depend on the quality and quantity of such insights,
which in turn should depend on the size of the subscription base that generates the underlying data.

5.

Conclusions

Motivated by the recent feud between a theater giant
(AMC) and a new digital platform (MoviePass), we
investigate their strategic interactions in a gametheoretic setting. A key feature of this setting is that
the theater—the seller—has the option of blocking

the platform, a nonessential middleman. And, somewhat unconventionally, the theater must set a high
individual ticket price to do so. Since a high price
can adversely affect the demand, the theater deters
the entry only when the benefit of cutting out the
middleman is large vis-à-vis the loss from a declining
demand. The resulting equilibrium depends on the
model parameters, in particular how the extra value
offered by the middleman (δ) compares with the
marginal cost to the theater (c). When the marginal
cost is low and the extra value is high, the theater
accommodates the entry; conversely, when the cost
is high and the value low, the theater blocks the
entry.
Interestingly, the theater’s ability to offer a pass
of its own also affects its ability to deter the middleman. The pass actually allows the theater to mitigate the adverse effect of a higher price necessary to
deter the entry, as the theater can now extend an
effective price reduction via the pass to certain portions of the market. Therefore, the ability to offer a
pass also translates to an enhanced ability to deter
the entry of the middleman. Since AMC did not
have a subscription platform of its own initially but
developed one later, its incentives to accommodate
MoviePass also waned subsequently. In other words,
insights from our model point to the plausible economic rationale for the “Hot-and-Cold” relationship
between AMC and MoviePass in recent years. More
importantly, they also point to the fact that a theater should view investments into building a subscription platform of its own from the perspective
of a strategic deterrent, and not merely as a tool to
support routine business operations.
Although developed within the context of the
movie industry, our insights may be applicable to
other industries where third-party subscription services are beginning to emerge. For example, Gympass offers a flexible pass that allows its subscribers to access up to thirty thousand gyms across
several metropolitan areas in the USA. Similar
to MoviePass, Gympass charges its subscribers a
monthly fee and, in exchange, promises them the
flexibility to workout wherever and whenever. ClassPass, which is similar, allows its subscribers to
choose any fitness class anywhere with just one subscription. ClassPass has presence in several major
US cities. Another recent startup known as Slay is
seeking to invade the beauty salon market with a
very similar approach. Likewise, MealPal is offering
gourmet lunch at participating restaurants as a subscription service. While each of these contexts has
its idiosyncrasies, the broad insights gleaned from
our model may shed some light on them as well.
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